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Abstract
Poisoning attacks, although have been studied extensively in supervised learning,
are not well understood in Reinforcement Learning (RL), especially in deep RL.
Prior works on poisoning RL usually either assume the attacker knows the underly-
ing Markov Decision Process (MDP), or directly apply the poisoning methods in
supervised learning to RL. In this work, we build a generic poisoning framework
for online RL via a comprehensive investigation of heterogeneous types/victims
of poisoning attacks in RL, considering the unique challenges in RL such as data
no longer being i.i.d. Without any prior knowledge of the MDP, we propose a
strategic poisoning algorithm called Vulnerability-Aware Adversarial Critic Poison
(VA2C-P), which works for most policy-based deep RL agents, using a novel
metric, stability radius in RL, that measures the vulnerability of RL algorithms.
Experiments on multiple deep RL agents and multiple environments show that
our poisoning algorithm successfully prevents agents from learning a good policy,
with a limited attacking budget. Our experiment results demonstrate varying vul-
nerabilities of different deep RL agents in multiple environments, benefiting the
understanding and applications of deep RL under security threat scenarios.
1 Introduction
Understanding the security of RL techniques is crucial as reinforcement learning (RL) is widely
applied in various real-world scenarios, including high-stakes ones such as autonomous driving
vehicles and healthcare systems; one should not rely on the decisions made by a RL agent easily
misled by an adversarial attacker. However, most existing researches on adversarial attack/defending
focus on supervised learning (SL), and adversarial learning for RL is not yet well understood.
In this paper, we systematically study the adversarial attacks in RL and vulnerability of RL algorithms,
with a focus on poisoning. Different from evasion attacks that craft adversarial test examples for a
well-trained model, poisoning attacks could cause failure of a learning process or “teach” the learner
an attacker-specified model in training. In RL, we categorize an attack as poisoning if it influences
the policy learned by the agent. Poisoning in RL is significantly different from poisoning in classic
SL, and could be more difficult due to the following challenges.
Challenge I – Future Data Unavailable in Online RL. Online RL is a decision making process where
the learner (the agent) learns a policy by interacting with the environment to generate trajectories
iteratively. A poisoning attack changes the current learner’s policy, and thus changes the future
trajectories generated by the policy. So, at each iteration, the optimal poison should work in the future
iterations to successfully poison the learning process, although the future is yet to be generated.
Challenge II – Data Samples No Longer i.i.d.. In RL, data samples (state-action transitions) are no
longer i.i.d, due to the Markovian property. Forcing an agent to choose a less-rewarding action in one
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state may lead the agent to more rewarding states in following steps. Challenge II is different from
I; it focus on the dependency among multiple steps in one iteration, while Challenge I focus on the
dependency among multiple iterations.
Challenge III – Unknown Dynamics of Environment. Although challenge I and II can be partially
addressed by predicting the future trajectories or steps, it requires prior knowledge on the dynamics
of the underlying Markov Decision Process (MDP). However, in complex environments such as Atari
games, knowing the dynamics of the MDP is difficult. Although the attacker could potentially interact
with the environment to build an estimate of the environment model, the cost of interacting with the
environment could be unrealistically high; market making [Spooner et al., 2018] for instance.
Challenge IV – Heterogeneous Poisoning Target Types. Moreover, poisoning could happen at
heterogeneous targets in RL, including states [Behzadan and Munir, 2017], actions [Pinto et al.,
2017], rewards [Ma et al., 2019], and even the underlying environment [Rakhsha et al., 2020],
different from SL where poisoning only happens at data features or labels. The lack of a uniform
framework for poisoning in RL makes it difficult to compare existing literature involving different
attacking types.
Previous works either do not address any the aforementioned challenges or only address some of
them. Behzadan and Munir [2017] achieve policy induction attacks for deep Q networks (DQN).
However, they view output actions of DQN similarly to labels in SL, and do not consider Challenge II
that the current action will influence future interactions. Ma et al. [2019] propose a poisoning attack
for model-based RL, but they suppose the agent learns from a batch of given data, not considering
Challenge I. Rakhsha et al. [2020] study poisoning for online RL, but they require perfect knowledge
of the MDP dynamics, which is unrealistic as stated in Challenge III.
In this paper, we systematically investigate poisoning in RL by considering all the aforementioned
RL-specific challenges.
Summary of Contributions. (1) We propose a generic poisoning framework for RL, showing their
connections to poisoning in SL as well as unique new challenges in solving online RL poisoning
problems; specifically we formalize the optimal poisoning process in online RL as a sequential
bi-level optimization problem;(2) we propose a practical poisoning algorithm called Vulnerability-
Aware Adversarial Critic Poison (VA2C-P) that works for multiple policy-gradient learners without
any prior knowledge of the environment, demonstrating RL agents’ vulnerabilities to even weaker
attackers with limited knowledge; (3) we introduce a novel metric, stability radius, to characterize the
stability of RL algorithms, measuring and comparing the vulnerabilities of RL algorithms in different
environments.
In Appendix A, we summarize some additional related works on evasion attacks in RL and poisoning
in supervised machine learning.
2 A Poisoning Framework for RL and Related Works
In this section, we establish a generic framework of poisoning in online RL, systematically character-
izing its challenges and difficulties from multiple perspectives - objective of poisoning, target type of
poisoning and attacker’s knowledge. Our in-depth comparison with the SL allows a thorough under-
standing of the additional vulnerability of online RL systems compared with the well-understood
SL systems. Our framework also provides a clear context to correctly position prior works in the
literature as well as to compare our work with existing works. Compared to the poisoning framework
described by Huang and Zhu [2019], we provide a solution for unifying these target types in one
attack model in Section 3.
We consider the online learning scenario, where the RL agent (the learner) does not know the
dynamics or rewards of the underlying MDP M with state space S, action space A, transition
dynamics P , rewards R and discount factor γ.
Settings and Notations In online RL, the learner interacts with the environment and collects ob-
servations. The learner’s algorithm, denoted by f , iteratively searches for a policy pi parametrized
by θ, through K interactions with the environment. Before learning starts, the learner initializes a
policy pi0. At each iteration k, the learner uses its previous policy pik−1 to roll out observations Ok
from the MDPM. Ok is a concatenation of multiple trajectories, denoted as Ok = (sk,ak, rk,dk),
where sk = [s1, s2, · · · ],ak = [a1, a2, · · · ], rk = [r1, r2, · · · ],dk = [d1, d2, · · · ] are respectively
the sequence of states, actions, rewards and the terminal state flags in iteration k. Then, with the ob-
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servations Ok, the learner updates its policy by attempting to solve argmaxpiJ(pi, pik−1,Ok), where
J is the objective function. The generated policy by the learner’s algorithm pik = f(pik−1,Ok)1 does
not necessarily achieve the maximization of the objective function.
In this paper, an overhead check signˇon a variable always denotes that the variable is poisoned. For
example, if the attacker changes a reward rt, then the poisoned reward is denoted as rˇt.
Poison Objective. We use LA to denote loss function of the poisoning attack, which the attacker
attempts to minimize. The form of LA is determined by its goal, which falls into one of the two
categories, non-targeted and targeted poisoning.
In non-targeted poisoning, the attack poisons a policy pi to pˇi to minimize the learner’s expected
rewards. Therefore the poison objective LA is to minimize the learner’s value η(pˇi).
In targeted poisoning, the attack “teaches” the agent to learn a pre-defined target policy pi†. Therefore
the poison objective LA is defined as distance2(pˇi, pi†).
Most existing poison RL researches focus on targeted poisoning [Ma et al., 2019, Rakhsha et al.,
2020], and non-targeted poisoning, although discussed by Huang and Zhu [2019], remains relatively
untouched.
Poison Target Types. To influence the behaviors of the learner, an attacker could inject poison at
multiple locations of the learner’s learning process as detailed in Figure 1. Part of the reason why
poisoning in RL is more challenging than in SL is that it involves more target types of poisoning,
some of which adapt with the environment, increasing the uncertainty.
Poison Training Data
(a) supervised learning
    
 Reward   
 State   
 Action   
Poison Executor
Poison Observation
    
Poison MDP
  - poison
  - poison
  - poison
  - poison
  - poison
(b) reinforcement learning
Figure 1: Different target types of poisoning in supervised learning and reinforcement learning.
Target Type I – Poison Observation (Or,Os). The attacker could manipulate the observation of
the learner, i.e., change O into Oˇ. This may happen when the attacker is able to intercept the
communication between the learner and the environment, similar to the man-in-the-middle attack in
cryptography. The attacker could target the rewards, called Or-poisoning, studied by Huang and Zhu
[2019]; or the states, called Os-poisoning, investigated by Behzadan and Munir [2017].
Target Type II – Poison MDP (MR,MP ). An attack could directly change the MDP (environment)
that the learner is interacting with, i.e., changeM into Mˇ. For example, a seller could influence the
behaviors of customers by changing the prices of products. The poison of MDP could be injected at
the reward model R or the transition dynamics P , respectively denoted asMR-poisoning (studied
by Ma et al. [2019]) andMP -poisoning (studied by Rakhsha et al. [2020]) . The analogy of poison
MDP in SL is to manipulate the underlying data distribution of the training data.
Target Type III – Poison Executor Ea. The executor of the learner could be poisoned. For example,
an attacker applies a force to the agent, so that the intended action “north” becomes “northeast”. Pinto
et al. [2017] train a robust RL agent against the executor poisoner. Denote this type of poisoning
as Ea-poisoning. We show in the appendix that Ea-poisoning is equivalent to directly changing a
stored in the observation O = (s,a, r,d).
See Appendix C for more explanations and examples.
Attacker’s Knowledge At the k-th iteration, what an attacker can do depends on its current knowl-
edge set, denoted by Kk. Kk could contain the underlying MDPM, the learner’s algorithm f , the
learner’s previous policy models θ1:k−1 as well as the previous and current observations O1:k.
1For algorithms with experience replay, the update can be extended as pik = f(pik−1,O1:k).
2There are many ways to define the distance between two policies, for instance KL-divergence for stochastic
policies [Schulman et al., 2015a], and average mismatch for deterministic policies [Rakhsha et al., 2020].
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An omniscient attacker knows everything , i.e, K(O)k = {M, f, θ1:k−1,O1:k}. Most guaranteed
policy teaching literature [Rakhsha et al., 2020, Ma et al., 2019] assume omniscient attacker. However
as motivated in the introduction, it is often unrealistic to exactly know the underlying environment.
We discuss two more realistic setting where the attacker only has limited knowledge as follows.
A monitoring attacker has some information but does not assume knowledge of the underlying
MDPM, i.e., K(M)k = {f, θ1:k−1,O1:k}. This is especially relevant in applications where learner’s
information is not secure (or even open), or an attacker hacks to steal information from the learner.
Monitoring attacker is similar to the white-box attacker in supervised learning.
A tapping attacker has very limited knowledge and knows the observations only, i.e., K(T )k ={O1:k}. This is widely applicable since the tapping the communication between the learner and the
environment is easy. Tapping attacker is analogous to the black-box attacker in supervised learning.
Behzadan and Munir [2017] consider a tapping attacker, which observes and manipulates the states
but does not know the learner’s parameters.
3 Poisoning Strategy via A Sequential Bilevel Optimization
In this section, we formulate the problem of poisoning in online RL through the lens of optimization.
We deliberately formulate the optimization problem to be as generic as possible, covering non-targeted
and targeted poison objective and all 3 poison target types.
π0 π1 π2
O1 Oˇ1 O2 Oˇ2
M1 M2
(a) Poison observation (Or,Os)
π0 π1 π2
Oˇ1 Oˇ2
Mˇ1 Mˇ2
M1 M2
(b) Poison MDP (MR,MP )
π0 π1 π2
Oˇ1 Oˇ2
πˇ0 πˇ1
M1 M2
(c) Poison Executor Ea
Figure 2: The online poisoning vs learning. Blue solid lines denote the learning processes, while red
dashed lines denote the poisoning processes. In iteration k, the learner uses its previous policy pik−1 to roll
out observations Ok from current MDP Mk, then updates its model and policy by pik = f(pik−1,Ok) =
argmaxpiJ(pi, pik−1,O). The attacker may (a) poison observations after they are generated, (b) poison MDP
before the learner generates observations, or (c) poison the policy when it is used to generate observations.
Among these three scenarios, Ok is always influenced by the attack, thus denoted as Oˇk.
Unified Problem Formulation. We introduce Problem (Q), a generic sequential bilevel opti-
mization for poisoning attacks. As detailed in Section 2, the attacker’s loss is the learner’s
value LA = η(pˇi) if poisoning is non-targeted, and LA = distance(pˇi, pi†) if poisoning is tar-
geted at pi†. We use D-poisoning to collectively denote any target types of the poisoning, where
D ∈ {MR,MP ,Or,Os, Ea}, illustrating the generality of our formulation. The online poisoning
process is visualized in Figure 2, which shows Ok is poisoned to Oˇk, conditioned on Dˇk, regardless
of the target type. Therefore, at iteration k, the optimal subsequent poisoning Dˇk, Dˇk+1, · · · , DˇK
are given by the optimal solution of Problem (Q).
argmin
Dˇk,··· ,DˇK
∑K
j=k
LA(pˇij)
s.t. pˇij = argmaxpiJ(pi, pij−1, Oˇj |Dˇj),∀k ≤ j ≤ K (learner’s poisoned learning)∑K
j=k
1{Dˇj 6= Dj} ≤ C (limited-budget)
U(Dj , Dˇj) ≤ ,∀k ≤ j ≤ K (limited-power)
(Q)
At each iteration, the learner attempts to obtain a policy that maximizes the objective function J as
shown in condition “(learner’s poisoned learning)”. For example, the objective function for TRPO is
pik = argmaxpi[Eˆt[
pi(at|st)
pik−1(at|st) Aˆt] − CDmaxKL (pik−1, pi)], where Aˆ is related with Ok, and C,DmaxKL
are defined in the paper [Schulman et al., 2015a].
To truthfully represent the real-world scenarios, we consider attacker’s constraints in two forms: (1)
the attack power  restricts the maximum change U(Dk, Dˇk) in one iteration, which can be defined
by any distance metric (e.g., `p-norm), in condition “(limited-power)” and (2) the attack budget C
restricts the number of iterations that the attacker could attack, in condition “(limited-budget)”.
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Difficulty in Sequential Bilevel Optimization. In supervised learning, the poison attacker solves
a bilevel optimization problem since the attacker, when making the decision of how to poison, has
to solve an optimization problem to predict how the learner reacts to the poison injected [Muñoz-
González et al., 2017]. Problem (Q) in online RL is even more challenging as the attacker has to
predict how the learner reacts to the poison not only at the current iteration k, but also for all future
iterations k + 1, . . ., since all decisions made at current time will have consequences in the future.
As a result, Problem (Q) in online RL is a sequential bilevel optimization problem, much more
challenging than in the supervised learning setting.
Possible Directions in Addressing Problem (Q)
Case (1) Under the often unrealistic setting of attacker being omniscient, the attacker can exactly
compute all observations Oˇk:K based on environment dynamics. Then, Problem (Q) reduces to a
fully-online case of the supervised learning attack studied by Wang and Chaudhuri [2018] where
the training data stream is known to the attacker. Note that even in this case, solving Problem (Q) is
NP-hard if C  K.
Case (2) For a non-omniscient attacker, future observations are not available. But it might be possible
for the attacker to train a prediction model [Oh et al., 2015] of the environment in advance, and use
the estimated model to predict future observations of the learner based on its current policy. However,
the computational cost could be very high.
Case (3) If the non-omniscient attacker can not study the environment ahead of time, and can
only learn along with the learner, then predicting the future becomes prohibitive. In this case, the
attacker has to sequentially make two decisions: “when to attack”, and “how to attack”, in order to
approximately solve Problem (Q).
We aim to tackle the more challenging but practical Case (3) and propose a poisoning algorithm
described in Section 4, with a focus on policy-gradient learners for demonstration purpose.
4 VA2C-P: Online Poisoning Algorithm for Policy Gradient Learners
In this section, we propose a practical and efficient poisoning algorithm called Vulnerability-Aware
Adversarial Critic Poison (VA2C-P) for policy gradient learners with on-policy updates. Although
the idea applies to the generic Problem (Q), we use the policy gradient learners as an example for a
simple demonstration of our algorithm.
Settings. In our algorithm, we focus on a monitoring attacker who knows the leaner’s policy model
θ (and thus piθ), observations O, as well as the learner’s algorithm f , but does not have access to
the environment. Without loss of generality, the attacker conducts Or-poisoning for simplicity of
demonstration. Different from most literature [Rakhsha et al., 2020, Ma et al., 2019], we choose
non-targeted poisoning, since a target policy is not usually available. Note that the learner is not
aware of the existence of the attacker.
We first address the decisions of “how to attack” and “when to attack” respectively, then introduce
the algorithm in Algorithm 1 in Appendix E.
4.1 How to Attack – Adversarial Critic
In the k-th iteration, the goal of the attacker is to find the optimal rˇk that minimizes the expected
total rewards of all the learner’s future policies pik:K , as suggested by Problem (Q). However, as
the future observations are not known yet, it is hard to determine which rˇk is optimal for reducing
all future rewards of the learner. Thus we propose to minimize the reward of the immediate next
iteration, instead of all future iterations. Then the optimization problem (Q) is relaxed as (P).
rˇk = argmin
rˇ
ηpik−1(pik) = Eτ∼pik−1 [
pik(τ)
pik−1(τ)
r(τ)]
s.t. pik = f(pik−1, rˇ)
‖rˇk − rk‖ ≤ 
(P)
Adversarial Critic. (P) uses importance sampling to evaluate the new policy pik via the trajectories
generated by pik−1. But in practice, directly using the sampled rewards to compute the policy value
may suffer from a high variance [Schulman et al., 2015b]. Thus, inspired by the Actor-Critic method,
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we propose to let the attacker fit a value function (network) Vω with the historical trajectories of the
learner, and use Vω to direct the learner to the decreasing-value direction, which is called Adversarial
Critic. Then the advantage function is estimated by A(st, at) = G(st, at) − Vω(st), where G
denotes the discounted future reward rt + γrt+1 + γ2rt+2 + · · · . Then the new objective becomes
Es,a∼pik−1 [
pik(a|s)
pik−1(a|s)Apik−1(a|s)], which is a first order taylor approximation of η(pik), similarly
with [Schulman et al., 2015a].
We use projected gradient descent to search the optimal rˇ. And the computation details are illustrated
in Appendix E.
Theoretical Interpretation of the Relaxation. The solution to Problem (P), namely rˇ#k is always
feasible to Problem (Q), although might not be optimal. Problem (P) only considers the immediate
next iteration instead of all successive iterations as Problem (Q) does, thus only if rˇ#k is also a
minimizer for
∑K
j=k+1 η(pij), could rˇ
#
k be optimal to Problem (Q), as detailed in Appendix F.2. We
also show in Appendix F.2 that one can justify whether a past poisoning decision could be optimal to
the future iterations once the future observations are received, which may help the attacker adjust its
decisions accordingly.
4.2 Decision 2: When to Attack – Vulnerability-Aware
It is important to select appropriate iterations to poison due to the limited attack budget C. The
question is then “in which iterations could the attacker achieve relatively stronger poisoning?” A
poisoning attack is considered as strong if it depraves the learner’s policy to a large degree.
We now define the vulnerability of a RL learning algorithm, which is not formally defined in prior
works. Inspired by the notion of stability in learning theory, which measures how a machine learning
algorithm changes due to a small perturbation of the input data, we formally investigate the stability
of an RL algorithm, a first attempt in the existing literature to the best of our knowledge.
Stability of RL Algorithms We first focus on one single update process of an algorithm f . Intuitively,
an update pi′ = f(pi,O) is stable if a poison does not cause any difference on the output policy pi′.
That is, the learning algorithm produces the same result regardless of the presence of the poison.
More formally, we define the concept of stability radius of one update in Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Stability Radius of One Update). For the update of an RL algorithm pi′ = f(pi,O),
under D-poison of any target types, the δ-stability radius of the update is defined as the minimum
poison power needed to cause δ change in policy (called δ policy descrepancy)
φδ(f, pi,O) = inf

{∃Dˇ s.t. U(D, Dˇ) ≤  and dmax[pi′||pˇi′] > δ, pˇi′ = f(pi, Oˇ|Dˇ)}, (1)
where U(D, Dˇ) denotes the poison power. Policy discrepancy dmax[pi1||pi2] =
maxs d
[
pi1(·|s)||pi2(·|s)
]
, where d[·||·] could be any measure of distribution distance.
Remarks. (1) The one-update stability radius is w.r.t. the algorithm f , the base policy pi and the
clean observation O. (2) The attacker takes effort to manipulate D and finally let the observation O
be changed to Oˇ. For different types of target D, the stability radius could be different. (3) Poison
with power under φδ(f, pi,O) will not cause the policy distributions to change more than δ. (4) As
shown by Proposition 2 in Section 5, poison with power under φδ(f, pi,O) will not make the reward
drop too much.
Estimating the Stability Property Directly computing the stability radius by definition is difficult,
as it accounts for all the possible -powered attacks in the space. So we consider the reversed way:
fix an attack power , then estimate how much the output policy will change by computing the policy
discrepancy ψk = d¯[pik||pˇik] := Es∼pik−1 [d[pik(·|s)||pˇik(·|s)]]. By definition,  is greater than or
equal to the ψ-stability radius of the algorithm for the current update. So, with the same , an update
with relatively large ψ is more likely to be vulnerable against poisoning.
Poisoning Algorithm VA2C-P. The implementation details are illustrated in Algorithm 1 in Ap-
pendix E, and the main steps are summarized as below.
With c iterations already poisoned, at iteration k, :
Step 1: compute the policy discrepancy achieved by -powered poison: ψ̂k;
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Step 2: form a pool/set of all historical policy discrepancies Ψ← Ψ ∪ ψ̂k;
Step 3: Attack by solving Problem (P) only if ψ̂k ≥ b C−cK−k c-th largest element in Ψ;
Step 4: k ← k + 1, repeat.
5 Measuring Vulnerability of RL Algorithms
Definition 1 measures the stability of one update based on policy discrepancy. But it is not obvious
whether the rewards change drastically due to the attacks. Proposition 2 provides a guarantee on the
performance of the poisoned policy pˇi′, compared with the un-poisoned new policy pi′.
Proposition 2. For an update of stochastic policy pi′ = f(pi,O), if its δ-stability radius is ε with the
total variance measure, then any poisoning effort smaller than ε on D will cause the reward drop by
no more than
4δ2γ|maxs,aApi′(s, a)|
(1− γ)2 + 2δEs∼pi′ [maxa Api′(s, a)]− Es,a∼pi′ [Api′(s, a)] (2)
where γ is the discount factor, and A is the advantage function, i.e., Api(s, a) = Qpi(s, a)− Vpi(s, a).
Proposition 2 shows that if the attack power is within the stability radius, the reward of the poisoned
policy will not be influenced too much. which also explains the motivation behind our proposed
vulnerability-aware attack. The proof is in Appendix D.3.
With the one-update stability measure, we are able to formally define the stability radius of an RL
algorithm w.r.t. an MDP.
Definition 3 (Stability Radius w.r.t an MDP). The δ-stability radius of an algorithm f in an MDPM
is defined as the minimal stability radius of all observations drawn from the MDP, and all possible
policies in policy space Π. If f is on-policy, then φ(f,M) = minpi∈Π,O∼pi φ(f, pi,O); if f is
off-policy, then φ(f,M) = minpi∈Π,O∼pi φ(f, pi,O), where pi is the behavior policy;
We also present a counterpart of stability radius in test time, namely robustness radius in Ap-
pendix D.1, as well as a comparison of vulnerability between supervised learning and RL in Ap-
pendix D.2. Stability radius and robustness radius together provide a principled way to measure
vulnerability of RL algorithms, respectively in training time and test time.
6 Experiments
In this section, we testify the performance of our proposed VA2C-P through experiments with multiple
algorithms on various environments.
Experiment Setup We choose 4 policy-based learning algorithms, including Vanilla Policy Gra-
dient [Sutton et al., 2000], as well as the state-of-the-art algorithms PPO [Schulman et al., 2017],
A2C [Mnih et al., 2016], and ACKTR [Wu et al., 2017]. And we choose 4 gym [Brockman et al.,
2016] environments with increasing difficulty levels: CartPole, Hopper, Walker and HalfCheetah.
Results of Poisoning Effects As discussed in Section 4, our VA2C-P aims to reduce the total rewards
(non-target poisoning) gained by the learner in online RL. The attacker knows the learner’s algorithm,
current model and observations, but does not know the underlying environment. Since there is few
methods working on the same setting, we compare the performance of VA2C-P with two baselines:
(1) a random attacker which randomly choose C iterations, and perturbs the reward to an arbitrary
direction by ; and (2) a simplified version of our algorithm, called Adversarial Critic Poison (AC-P),
which decides “how to attack” in the same way with VA2C-P, but chooses “when to attack” randomly.
Figure 3 shows the mean rewards each learner gains under different kinds of poisoning methods, with
various budget C. Compared with random attack, our proposed VA2C-P, and the simplified version
AC-P make the reward drop more significantly. And VA2C-P outperforms AC-P in most cases, which
implies that the vulnerability-based attack decision works in practice. As C/K increases, VA2C-P
and AC-P achieve stronger attacks, while random poison method does not show a consistent tendency.
We observe that in some experiments (e.g., Hopper-PPO, Walker-ACKTR, etc), the random poison
method not only does not make the learning worse, but also even “facilitates” the learner. For
Hopper-ACKTR, the learner with a random attacker obtains 3× reward than without any poisoning.
This phenomenon is rare in SL, because the input data and the output labels have relatively determin-
istic relations. If the attacker randomly changes the label of one picture, then the changed label should
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be different from the true one, and as a result, will mislead the learner to some degree. However, in
RL, a reward signal is not the true value of the corresponding state-action pair, and it is very possible
that a randomly changed reward will lead the learner to find a rewarding state afterwards. Therefore,
poisoning RL is more difficult than poisoning SL, due to the uncertainty of the environment. This
also reflects Challenge I and Challenge II as pointed out in Section 1.
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Figure 3: Comparison of mean rewards of VPG, PPO, A2C, ACKTR on various environments, with no
poisoning, random poisoning, AC-P and VA2C-P.
Discussion: How Does Vulnerability Vary? As we states by the Decision 2 in Section 4, we
approximately measure the vulnerability by computing the policy discrepancy triggered by a fixed
poison power . Figure 4 shows some examples of how policy discrepancy changes with the iteration
number k, when there is no poisoning.
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Figure 4: Comparison of policy discrepancies at every iteration.
We see that the policy discrepancy decreases as k gets larger, which implies that the later iterations
tend to be more stable than former iterations. It is intuitively reasonable, because as the learner
accumulates more experience, it becomes less sensitive to its inputs. In addition, the same algorithm
tends to be more vulnerable in more complex Walker environment than the simpler CartPole
environment, matching the results discovered by Gleave et al. [2019], which show that the learner
is more vulnerable to adversarial policies in higher-dimensional environments in test time. Also, we
find that in the same environment, the more complicated algorithm PPO is more vulnerable than
the simpler VPG. This phenomenon is analogous to the accuracy-robustness dilemma in SL, i.e.,
classifiers with higher classification accuracy are usually less robust [Zhang et al., 2019].
We put more experiment results in Appendix G, and demo videos in supplementary materials.
7 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we build a generic poisoning framework for online RL with an in-depth comparison
with SL, and propose VA2C-P, an attack for online RL. A metric, stability radius, is introduced to
measure the vulnerability of RL algorithms. In this paper, we discuss the scenario where the attacker
only poisons one type of target. But it could also be extended to a simultaneous poisoning on multiple
target types. Ultimately, by studying the attacks in RL, we aim to understand the vulnerability of RL
agents and finally design robust RL agents that can combat adversarial attacks.
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Broader Impact
Despite the rapid advancement on interactive AI and ML systems using RL agents, the learning agent
could fail catastrophically in the presence of adversarial attacks, exposing a serious vulnerability
in current RL systems such as autonomous driving systems, market making systems and security
monitoring systems. Understanding their vulnerability and studying attack models are of vital
importance; “if you know yourself and your enemy, you’ll never lose a battle” as they say.
In this work, we define a unified framework for poisoning in online Reinforcement Learning (RL),
and formalize the optimal poisoning process as a sequential bi-level optimization. We further propose
a practical and generic poisoning algorithm that can poison the learner to learn a bad policy, without
any prior knowledge of the underlying environment. The algorithm is based on the relaxation of the
original sequential bi-level optimization problem. We provide theoretical analysis of the relaxation
tightness.
We also propose a metric, stability radius, to measure the stability of RL algorithms under poisoning
attacks, as well as a metric, robustness radius, for measuring the robustness of RL algorithms under
evasion attacks (in Appendix D.1). These metrics make it possible to characterize and compare the
vulnerability of RL algorithms on different environments and different learning stages. In RL-based
applications where policy stability is important, or where adversarial attacks exist, our proposed
stability radius and robustness radius could help make informed and secure decisions, such as which
algorithm to use, when to be more alarmed about possible attackers, etc. As a result, our work has
the potential to help combat the threat to high-stakes systems such as autonomous driving systems,
healthcare medical systems and national security.
Our work puts an effort to bridge the gap between two communities – security in supervised ML and
Reinforcement Learning – with the goal to finally push advancement of security in reinforcement
learning by help adapt the well established knowledge of poisoning in Supervised Learning (SL)
to poisoning in online RL. Through a thorough comparison with poisoning in SL, we show the
connections as well as unique new challenges of solving RL poisoning problems.
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Appendix: Vulnerability-Aware Poisoning Mechanism for Online RL
with Unknown Dynamics
A Additional Related Works
Adversarial Attacks in Supervised Learning Adversarial attacking and defending are attracting
more and more attention nowadays [Huang et al., 2011, Biggio et al., 2012, Steinhardt et al., 2017].
Poisoning, as one popular type of adversarial attacking, has been well-studied in the field of machine
learning [Biggio et al., 2012, Mei and Zhu, 2015], including deep learning [Muñoz-González et al.,
2017, Shafahi et al., 2018]. Wang and Chaudhuri [2018] consider online learning, which is similar
to ours. However, they focus on supervised learning, where the attacker knows all the data stream,
while in our RL setting, the whole training data stream is not available to the attacker (as Challenge I
states).
Poisoning in Reinforcement Learning Some related works focus on poisoning stochastic ban-
dits Jun et al. [2018], Liu and Shroff [2019] and contextual bandits Ma et al. [2018]. Policy teaching
(targeted poisoning) is a specific type of poisoning for RL, where the attacker could lead the agent
to learn a pre-defined target policy by manipulating the rewards Zhang and Parkes [2008], Zhang
et al. [2009] or dynamics Rakhsha et al. [2020] of the MDP. However, they require the attackers to
have prior knowledge of the environments (e.g., the dynamics of the MDP), which is often unrealistic
or difficult in practice. Ma et al. [2019] introduce a policy teaching framework for batch-learning
model-based agents, while the attacker knows the MDP and the training data batch before the agent
learns. Huang and Zhu [2019] propose a reward-poisoning attack model, and provide convergence
analysis for Q-learning. However, the introduced attack also requires the attacker has a perfect
knowledge of the MDP. Behzadan and Munir [2017] achieve policy poisoning on DQN by crafting
perturbed states such that the target action is selected by the leaner, which is analogous to supervised
learning, and the data-correlation problem of RL is not considered.
Evasion Attacks in Reinforcement As summarized by Chen et al. [2019], evasion attacks at test-
time such as adversarial perturbation and defense mechanisms in deep reinforcement learning (DRL)
are under rapid development. A line of works consider adversarial perturbations on observations,
similar to adversarial examples in supervised learning. Huang et al. [2017] first show that neural
network policies are vulnerable to evasion attacks on states, by generating state perturbation with
fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [Goodfellow et al., 2014]. Lin et al. [2017] consider the data-
correlation problem in RL, and propose a strategical attack method, which perturbs an input state s
only if the agent has “a strong preference on action selection”, i.e., maxa pi(a|s)−mina pi(a|s) is
large. This work and our works both consider the constraint that the attacker is only able to attack
for limited times, and provide strategies to decide “when to attack” to maximize the attacker’s profit.
However, our work deals with poisoning attacks, which can not be tackled by the method in [Lin et al.,
2017] since the agent does not follow a good policy with effective “action preference” in training
time.
In addition, Gleave et al. [2019] show that choosing an adversarial policy in multi-agent RL could
also negatively affect the victim agent. There is also a line of work focusing on adversarial examples
in path-finding problems Xiang et al. [2018], Bai et al. [2018].
B Notations and Preliminaries
In RL, an agent interacts with the environment by taking actions, observing states and receiving
rewards. The environment is modeled by a Markov Decision Process (MDP), which is denoted by a
tupleM = 〈S,A, P,R, γ〉, where S is the state space, A the action space, P the transition kernel, R
the reward function, and γ ∈ (0, 1) the discount factor.
At every step, the agent selects an action based on the current policy pi. A stochastic policy pi :
S ×A → [0, 1] defines the probability of choosing each action in each state. A trajectory τ generated
by pi is a sequence s1, a1, r1, s2, a2, · · · , where s0 ∼ µ, at ∼ pi(a|st), st+1 ∼ P (s|st, at) and
rt = R(st, at). Define an observation sequence as the concatenation of multiple trajectories generated
by taking a policy in an environment, denoted as O = (s,a, r,d), where s = [s1, s2, · · · ],a =
[a1, a2, · · · ], r = [r1, r2, · · · ],d = [d1, d2, · · · ] are respectively the sequence of states, actions,
rewards and the terminal state flags.
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The goal of an RL agent is to find a policy pi∗ that maximizes the expected total rewards η, which is
defined as η(pi) = Eτ∼pi[r(τ)] = Es1,a1,···[
∑∞
t=1 γ
t−1rt].
The state value function V pi(s) is defined as V pi(s) = Eat,···[
∑∞
h=0 γ
hrt+h|st = s]. Similarly, the
state-action value function Qpi(s, a) is Qpi(s, a) = Est+1,···[
∑∞
h=0 γ
hrt+h|st = s, at = a]
C Target Types of Attacking: More Detailed Explanation
π0 π1 π2
O1 Oˇ1 O2 Oˇ2
M1 M2
(a) Poison observation (Or,Os)
π0 π1 π2
Oˇ1 Oˇ2
Mˇ1 Mˇ2
M1 M2
(b) Poison MDP (MR,MP )
π0 π1 π2
Oˇ1 Oˇ2
πˇ0 πˇ1
M1 M2
(c) Poison Executor Ea
Figure 5: The online poisoning vs learning. Blue solid lines denote the learning processes, while red
dashed lines denote the poisoning processes. In iteration k, the learner uses its previous policy pik−1 to roll
out observations Ok from current MDP Mk, then updates its model and policy by pik = f(pik−1,Ok) =
argmaxpiJ(pi, pik−1,O). The attacker may (a) poison observations after they are generated, (b) poison MDP
before the learner generates observations, or (c) poison the policy when it is used to generate observations.
Among these three scenarios, Ok is always influenced by the attack, thus denoted as Oˇk.
C.1 Poison Observation
Consider a deep reinforcement learning algorithm, which uses its old policy to generate a series of
observations and updates its policy with the collected observations at every iteration. The observa-
tions are stored in a temporary buffer in the form of (s,a, r,d), where s, r,d are returned by the
environment, and a is produced by the policy itself.
An attacker could stay in the middle between the learner and the environment and falsify s, r returned
by the environment before the learner receives them. (It is also possible to alter the terminal state
flags d, but it is relatively easier for the learner to detect, and its influence to the learner is not as
large as s and r, so we do not discuss this attack type.) On the other hand, the attacker may also hack
the observation buffer to change s, r. In both cases, poisoning s and r are called Os-poisoning and
Or-poisoning respectively.
Note that in the case of hacking observation buffer, the attacker also has the option to manipulate a
in O. But we do not include this kind of attack in observation poisoning, because not like states and
rewards, the actions are taken by the learner, so it is easy for the learner to detect the change of action
sequence stored in the buffer. And we will show in Section C.3 that changing a in O is similar to the
case of executor poisoning.
C.2 Poison MDP
MDP poisoning can be considered as “changing the reality” for the learner. For example, an attacker
decides to increase the reward for state-action pair (s, a) by ∆ at iteration t, it then changes the
parameterRk(s, a) of the environment to Rˇk(s, a) = Rk(s, a)+∆. As a result, whenever the learner
visits (s, a) in the current iteration, it receives Rˇk(s, a) as its reward. A more intuitive example is
depicted in Figure 6, where we want to train a mouse to find the cheese in a maze. However, if
some bad man adds another piece of cheese in the training environment, the mouse is likely to be
misled. Then, in the test time, the “malicious cheese” is removed, but the mouse still wants to find
the malicious cheese instead of the original one.
Compared with observation poisoning and executor poisoning, MDP Poisoning is more powerful and
more difficult to defend against. An example of MDP poisoning is given by Rakhsha et al. [2020],
where the attacker can force the learner to learn a target policy with guarantees.
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(a) training environment (b) poisoned environment
???
(c) test environment
Figure 6: An intuitive example of MDP poisoning.
C.3 Poison Executor
In the online RL process, the learner learns by taking actions and getting feedbacks of the actions. If
observation poisoning is viewed as changing the feedbacks, then executor poisoning can be viewed as
perturbing the actions taken by the learner. For example, for an auto-driving agent, one can slightly
add some force to the steering wheel, so when the agent takes “steer left 90 degrees”, what actually
happens is “steer left 100 degrees”. In this way, the trained policy is biased.
We now show that the aforementioned attack of changing a in O could be converted to executor
poisoning. We describe the following two scenarios respectively for these two poisoning attacks and
show they have equal effects. For simplicity, we only consider one step of the interaction, which can
be simply extended to multiple steps.
(1) Poisoning a in O. For one-step experience, the learner observes state s, takes action ai, receives
reward ri = R(s, ai) and observes a new state s′i ∼ P (·|s, ai), then the tuple (s, ai, ri, s′i) will be
stored in the observation buffer. Now the attacker may change the action ai to aj , and the tuple
becomes (s, aj , ri, s′i). Finally, the learner regard ri, s
′
i and the following observations as caused by
aj , instead of ai.
(2) Poisoning Executor. In the same environment, suppose the learner observes state s, and takes
action aj , then the attacker conducts executor poisoning and changes aj to ai, then the reward and
the next state will also change to ri = R(s, ai) and s′i ∼ P (·|s, ai). The learner does not know the
falsification of action and stores (s, aj , ri, s′i) to the buffer. Finally, the attacker will take ri, s
′
i and
the future observations as caused by aj , and updates its policy accordingly.
Based on the descriptions, we can see changing ai to aj in the buffer is equivalent to changing aj
to ai on the executor. If we assume the policy always has non-zero probability on all actions, then
for any manipulation on a in O, it is possible to achieve the same effects by attacking the executor.
Hence, given the fact that the former attack can be trivially defended, we only discuss executor
poisoning in our poisoning framework.
D Robustness and Stability of RL Algorithms: Supplementary Materials
D.1 Robustness Radius
Different with poisoning, test-time evasion (adversarial examples) misleads the agent by manipulating
the states only, since the agent no longer learns from interactions and feedbacks. Note that although
Gleave et al. [2019] propose an attack called “adversarial policy”, the perturbation does not happen
in the policy, but still happens in the input states (observations) of the agent.
To study how robust a trained policy is, we define the robustness radius with regard to both a single
state and the whole environment.
Definition 4 (Robustness Radius of Policy w.r.t. a State). The robustness radius of a deterministic
policy pi on a state s is defined as the minimal perturbation of s which changes the output action, i.e.,
ρ(pi, s) = inf
ε
{∃sˇ ∈ S ∩ Bε(s) s.t. pi(s) 6= pi(sˇ)} (3)
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Similarly, for any 0 < δ < 1, the δ-robustness radius of a stochastic policy pi on a state s is defined as
the minimal perturbation of s which makes the output action distribution disagrees with the original
pi(s) with probability more than δ, i.e.,
ρ(pi, s) = inf
ε
{∃sˇ ∈ S ∩ Bε(s) s.t. d
(
pi(·|s)||pi(·|sˇ)) > δ} (4)
where d(·|·) could be any distance measure between two distributions.
Remark. If we regard the policy as a classifier which “classifies” a state to an action, then the
robustness radius of policy defined above is analogous to the robustness radius of classifiers defined
by Wang et al. [2017], with an extension to stochastic predictions.
Definition 5 (Robustness Radius w.r.t an MDP). The (δ-)robustness radius of a policy pi in an MDP
M is defined as the maximal robustness radius of all states, i.e., ρ(pi,M) = mins∈S ρ(pi, s)
Remarks. (1) A deterministic policy is robust against any state perturbation smaller than ρ(pi,M).
(2) For a stochastic policy, if its δ-robustness radius in anM is ε, then any state perturbation within ε
will cause reward drop by no more than
4δ2γ|maxs,aApi′(s, a)|
(1− γ)2 + 2δEs∼pi′ [maxa Api′(s, a)]− Es,a∼pi′ [Api′(s, a)], (5)
which is proven in the same way with Proposition 2 (see Appendix D.3).
D.2 Vulnerability Comparison: Difference Between SL and RL
To shed some light on understanding adversarial attacks in RL, we compare SL and RL in terms of
their vulnerability to poisoning and adversarial examples.
At test time, a policy network receives states as input, and returns probabilities of choosing each
actions as output; a value network receives states (or state-action pairs) as input, and returns the
corresponding value as the output. Thus, test-time RL systems are very similar to SL systems,
as one can view the policy networks as classification networks, and value networks as regression
networks. However, the key difference between evasion in RL and evasion in SL is, data samples
are not independent in RL. A single adversarial example in SL test dataset may cause at most one
misclassification instance, whereas an adversarial example in RL may case a drastic change of the
gained rewards (e.g., by leading the agent to a "devastating" or "absorbing" state).
At training time, SL systems and RL systems are significantly different, as Figure 1 shows. Even
when the supervised learner also learns from data streams in an online manner, the training data
are independent with the learner’s classifier. In contrast, the distribution of training data samples
changes as the learner updates its policy. Poisoning attacks against an SL system could alter the
decision boundary, so that the learner makes wrong decisions for certain data samples. For an RL
system, poisoning attacks could (1) alter the decision boundary so that the learner chooses bad actions
for certain states, and also (2) change the following observations and interactions due to a different
selection of action.
In summary, an adversarial attacker may cause higher damages on RL systems than on SL systems,
with the same power and budget. But it does not suggests attacking RL systems is easier than
attacking SL systems. As every coin has two sides, the high uncertainty of the environment may help
an attack reduce the learner’s reward, but may also lead the learner to gain higher reward in the future
(as shown in Section 6). Therefore, it is more challenging to successfully attack RL systems than SL
systems with a specific goal.
D.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. According to the definition of δ-stability radius, for any poisoning effort within ε, the poisoned
policy satisfies DmaxTV [pi
′||pˇi′] ≤ δ (assume total variance DTV is the distance measure between policy
distributions). We are interested in the difference of expected rewards η(pi′)− η(pˇi′).
Define Lpi′(pˇi′) = η(pi′) +
∑
s∈S ρpi′(s)
∑
a∈A pˇi
′(a|s)Api′(s, a).
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Since DmaxTV [pi
′||pˇi′] ≤ δ, follow Theorem 1 in paper [Schulman et al., 2015a], we can get
|η(pˇi′)− Lpi′(pˇi′)| ≤ 4δ
2γ|maxs,aApi′(s, a)|
(1− γ)2 . (6)
So we have
|η(pˇi′)− η(pi′)−
∑
s∈S
ρpi′(s)
∑
a∈A
pˇi′(a|s)Api′(s, a)| ≤ 4δ
2γ|maxs,aApi′(s, a)|
(1− γ)2 , (7)
which can be transformed to
η(pi′)− η(pˇi′) ≤ 4δ
2γ|maxs,aApi′(s, a)|
(1− γ)2 −
∑
s∈S
ρpi′(s)
∑
a∈A
pˇi′(a|s)Api′(s, a). (8)
We upper bound the term −∑s∈S ρpi′(s)∑a∈A pˇi′(a|s)Api′(s, a) as below.
−
∑
s∈S
ρpi′(s)
∑
a∈A
pˇi′(a|s)Api′(s, a)
=Es∼pi′ [−
∑
a∈A
pˇi′(a|s)Api′(s, a)]
=Es∼pi′ [−
∑
a∈A
pˇi′(a|s)Api′(s, a) +
∑
a∈A
pi′(a|s)Api′(s, a)−
∑
a∈A
pi′(a|s)Api′(s, a)]
=Es∼pi′
[
Api′(s, a)
(∑
a∈A
(pi′(a|s)− pˇi′(a|s)))−∑
a∈A
pi′(a|s)Api′(s, a)
]
≤Es∼pi′
[
2δmax
a∈A
Api′(s, a)−
∑
a∈A
pi′(a|s)Api′(s, a)
]
=2δEs∼pi′ [max
a∈A
Api′(s, a)]− Es,a∼pi′ [Api′(s, a)]
(9)
Combining the above results, we obtain
η(pi′)− η(pˇi′) ≤ 4δ
2γ|maxs,aApi′(s, a)|
(1− γ)2 + 2δEs∼pi′ [maxa Api′(s, a)]− Es,a∼pi′ [Api′(s, a)] (10)
E Algorithm
Algorithm 1 shows the detailed procedure of VA2C-P, where the learner’s policy pi is parametrized
by θ.
To solve (P), assume ∂θk∂rˇ exists, one can use projected gradient descent to update r by using the
chain rule:
∂ηpiθk−1 (piθk)
∂rˇ
=
∂ηpiθk−1 (piθk)
∂θk
∂θk
∂rˇ
.
For Vanilla Policy Gradient (VPG) whose update rule is, θk = θk−1 + α∇θk−1 ηˆ(piθk−1 , r), where
∇θk−1 ηˆ(piθk−1 , r) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
(
T∑
t=1
∇θk−1 log piθk−1(a(i)t |s(i)t ))(
T∑
t=1
r
(i)
t )
)
, (11)
we can derive
∇θηpiθk−1 (piθk) ≈
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
ΠTt=1
piθk(a
(i)
t |s(i)t )
piθk−1(a
(i)
t |s(i)t )
(
T∑
t=1
∇θk log piθk(a(i)t |s(i)t ))(
T∑
t=1
γt
′−1r(i)t )
)
.
(12)
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Algorithm 1: VA2C-P with Or-Poisoning
Input: total iterations of learning K; poisoning power ; poisoning budget C; attacker’s
learning rate β; maximum computing iterations J ; distribution distance measure d
1 Initialize policy discrepancies as an empty list Ψ = ∅
2 Initialize the number of already poisoned iterations c = 0
3 Initialize value network Vω
4 for k = 1, · · · ,K do
5 if c > C then
6 Break
7 Get the current observation Ok and the learner’s policy model θk−1
8 Fit the value function: ω ← argminω
∑
τi∈Ok
∑T
t=1(Vω(s
(i)
t )−
∑T
t′=t γ
t′−tr(i)t )
2
9 Imitate learner’s update with the clean rewards θk, η ← Update(θk−1, r)
10 Initialize rˇ as the original r in Ok
11 Set η0 = ηc
12 for j = 1, · · · , J do
13 for i = 1, · · · , N and t = 1, · · · , T do
14 Copy r′ ← rˇ, and add a small value ∆ to [r′](i)t
15 Imitate learner’s update with poisoned rewards θ′, η′ ← Update(θk−1, r′)
16 Compute the direct gradient: ∂η
∂rˇ
(i)
t
← η′−ηj−1∆
17 Update the poisoned reward: rˇ ← ΠB(r)
(
rˇ − β ∂η∂rˇ
)
18 Imitate learner’s update with poisoned rewards θˇk, ηj ← Update(θk−1, r′)
19 if (ηj − ηj−1) converges then
20 Break
21 Compute ψk = 1NT
∑
s
(i)
t
d(piθk ||piθˇk) and add ψk to Ψ
22 if ψk is larger than the b(C − c)/(K − k)c-th largest element in Ψ then
23 Attack: replace r with rˇ in Ok and send it back to the learner
24 c← c+ 1
25 Procedure Update(θ, r)
26 Perform an update with the learner’s algorithm θ′ ← f(θ, r)
27 Compute the attacker’s objective
η ← 1NT
∑
τi∈Ok
∑T
t=1(
piθ′ (a
(i)
t |s(i)t )
piθ(a
(i)
t |s(i)t )
)(
∑T
t′=t γ
t′−tr(i)t − Vω(sit))
28 return θ′, η
and
[∇rθk]t =
t∑
j=1
∇θk−1 log piθk−1(aj |sj)γt−j (13)
Although ∂θk∂rˇ has a closed-form expression for simple learners like VPG, analytically computing
how the poisoned reward influences the model is challenging for more complicated learners like PPO,
whose update rule is an argmax function. Therefore, we use the Direct Gradient Method proposed
by Yang et al. [2017] to approximate the gradient by
∂ηpiθk−1 (piθk)
∂rˇ
=
ηpiθk−1 (f(piθk−1 , r + ∆))− ηpiθk−1 (f(piθk−1 , r))
∆
(14)
F Theoretical Interpretation of the Bi-level Optimization Problem
In this section, we discuss the problem relaxation made in Section 4.1.
F.1 Problem Forms
Suppose the attacker has budget C = K. Then following the format of Problem (Q), we could
define the original Or-poisoning optimization problem for the poisoning at the k-th iteration as
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Problem (P∗). Note that for notation simplicity, we use the policy parameter θ to denote the policy
piθ, so that η(θ) := η(piθ).
argmin
rˇk,··· ,rˇK
K∑
j=k
η(θj)
s.t. θj = f(θk−1, rˇj)
‖rˇj − rj‖ ≤ , ∀j = k, · · · ,K
(P∗)
Note that we only optimize on rˇk to rˇK , since previous k − 1 decisions have already been made at
the k-th iteration.
Although an omniscient attacker is able to predict all the observations and solve Problem (P∗)
directly, for the non-omniscient attacker that we focus on, Problem (P∗) is not solvable because
of the unknown observations in iteration k + 1 to K. Hence, as discussed in Section 4, we relax
(P∗), a multi-variable optimization problem, to (K − k + 1) sequential single-variable optimization
problems
argmin
rˇk
η(θk)
s.t. θk = f(θk−1, rˇk)
‖rˇk − rk‖ ≤ 
(Pk)
argmin
rˇk+1
η(θk+1)
s.t. θk+1 = f(θk, rˇk+1)
‖rˇk+1 − rk+1‖ ≤ 
(Pk+1)
and all the way to
argmin
rˇK
η(θK)
s.t. θK = f(θK−1, rˇK)
‖rˇK − rK‖ ≤ 
(PK)
where rj ∼ θj−1,∀j = k, · · · ,K.
Note that rk is already generated and known for all the above problems. When solving Problem (Pj),
rj and θj are also known (determined by θj−1).
F.2 Tightness of Problem Relaxation
Problem (P∗) is a (K − k+ 1)-variable optimization problem with (K − k+ 1) equality constraints
and (K−k+1) inequality constraints. And Problem (Pk), · · · , (PK) are (K−k+1) single-variable
optimization problems respectively with 1 equality constraints and 1 inequality constraints. The two
sets of problems are naturally equivalent if θk, · · · , θK , as well as the constraints are independent.
However, due to the online learning process (Figure 2), θk+1 and rk+1 are all dependent on θk and
rˇk, which makes the relaxation not necessarily optimal.
We call the optimal solution to Problem (P∗) as (rˇ∗k, · · · , rˇ∗K), and the optimal solutions to Prob-
lem (Pk) to (PK) as rˇ
#
k , · · · , rˇ#K .
For simplicity, we assume the environment and the policies are all deterministic. So that the value of
observed reward rj is a deterministic function of θj−1.
We claim that the relaxation does not change the feasibility as stated in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. (rˇ#k , · · · , rˇ#K) is a feasible solution to Problem (P∗).
Proof. Note that rk is known and the same for both (P∗) and (Pk).
(1) rˇ#k is feasible to (P∗) because it satisfies ‖rˇ#k − rk‖ ≤ .
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(2) For Problem (P∗), with θk = f(θk−1, rˇ#k ), rk+1 is the same with the rk+1 in Problem Pk+1.
Since the optimal solution to (Pk+1), rˇ
#
k+1, satisfies ‖rˇ#k+1 − rk+1‖ ≤ , rˇ#k+1 is also feasible to
(P∗).
(3) By induction, {rˇ#j }Kj=k all satisfy the constraints in (P∗) at the same time, so (rˇ#k , · · · , rˇ#K) is a
feasible solution to Problem (P∗).
Note that if the environment or the policy is stochastic, then rj is a random variable sampled
from some distribution defined by θj−1. In this case, the constraints for Problem (P∗) should be
Pr(‖rˇj − rj‖ ≤ ) ≥ t, ∀j = k, · · · ,K, where t ∈ [0, 1] is a threshold probability. Then, with
appropriate t, Proposition 6 also holds.
So far we have shown that the relaxation is feasible, so that the attacker will not plan for a non-feasible
poisoning with VA2C-P. Next, we discuss the optimality of the relaxation.
We first make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: the learner’s update function f(θ, rˇ) is differentiable w.r.t. rˇ and θ.
Assumption 2: the environment and the policies are all deterministic, and the reward r generated by a
policy piθ is differentiable w.r.t. θ (i.e. R(s, piθ(s) is differentiable w.r.t. θ).
Proposition 7. If Assumption 1 and 2 hold, the necessary condition for (rˇ#k , · · · , rˇ#K) being an
optimal solution to Problem (P∗) is, for all j = k, · · · ,K,
∂η(θj)
∂θj
∂θj
∂rˇj
|rˇj=rˇ#j =
K∑
j′=j+1
∂η(θj′)
∂θj′
∂θj′
∂θj′−1
· · · ∂θj+1
∂θj
∂θj
∂rˇj
|rˇj=rˇ#j (15)
Proof. Consider the case K = 2 for simplicity, and the results naturally extend to a larger K.
At iteration 1, Problem (P∗) becomes
argmin
rˇ1,rˇ2
η(θ1) + η(θ2)
s.t. θ1 = f(θ0, rˇ1)
θ2 = f(θ1, rˇ2)
‖rˇ1 − r1‖ ≤ 
‖rˇ2 − r2‖ ≤ 
(P0)
where θ0 and r1 are known.
The relaxed problems are
argmin
rˇ1
η(θ1)
s.t. θ1 = f(θ0, rˇ1)
‖rˇ1 − r1‖ ≤ 
(P1)
where θ0 and r1 are known, and
argmin
rˇ2
η(θ2)
s.t. θ2 = f(θ1, rˇ2)
‖rˇ2 − r2‖ ≤ 
(P2)
where θ1 and rˇ2 are determined by rˇ1, the solution to (P1).
Suppose rˇ#1 and rˇ
#
2 are the optimal solutions to (P1) and (P2). And we discuss the necessary
condition for rˇ#1 and rˇ
#
2 being optimal to (P0).
We can rewrite (P1) as
argmin
rˇ1
η(f(θ0, rˇ1))
s.t. ‖rˇ1 − r1‖2 − 2 + y21 = 0
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And the Lagrange function of the above problem is
L(rˇ1, λ1, y1) = η(f(θ0, rˇ1)) + λ1(‖rˇ1 − r1‖2 − 2 + y21) (16)
The necessary conditions for rˇ1 being optimal are
∂η(f(θ0, rˇ1))
∂rˇ1
+
∂λ1(‖rˇ1 − r1‖2 − 2 + y21)
∂rˇ1
= 0 (17)
‖rˇ1 − r1‖2 − 2 + y21 = 0 (18)
λ1y1 = 0 (19)
for some λ1 and y1.
Similarly, for Problem (P2), the necessary conditions of optimality are
∂η(f(θ1, rˇ2))
∂rˇ2
+
∂λ2(‖rˇ2 − r2‖2 − 2 + y22)
∂rˇ2
= 0 (20)
‖rˇ2 − r2‖2 − 2 + y22 = 0 (21)
λ2y2 = 0 (22)
for some λ2 and y2.
Since rˇ#1 and rˇ
#
2 are the optimal solutions to (P1) and (P2), rˇ
#
1 and rˇ
#
2 satisfy Equation (17) ∼
(22).
Expanding (17) and (20), we get
∂η
∂θ1
∂θ1
∂rˇ1
|rˇ1=rˇ#1 + 2λ1(rˇ
#
1 − r1) = 0 (23)
∂η
∂θ2
∂θ2
∂rˇ2
|rˇ2=rˇ#2 + 2λ2(rˇ
#
2 − r2) = 0 (24)
For Problem (P0), the Lagrange is
L(rˇ1, rˇ2λ
′
1, λ
′
2, y
′
1, y
′
2) = η(f(θ0, rˇ1))+λ
′
1(‖rˇ1−r1‖2−2+(y′1)2)+η(f(θ2, rˇ2))+λ′2(‖rˇ2−r2‖2−2+(y′2)2)
(25)
And the necessary conditions for rˇ1, rˇ2 being optimal are
∂η(f(θ0, rˇ1))
∂rˇ1
+
∂η(f(θ1, rˇ2))
∂rˇ1
+
∂λ′1(‖rˇ1 − r1‖2 − 2 + (y′1)2)
∂rˇ1
+
∂λ′2(‖rˇ2 − r2‖2 − 2 + (y′2)2)
∂rˇ1
= 0
(26)
∂η(f(θ1, rˇ2))
∂rˇ2
+
∂λ′2(‖rˇ2 − r2‖2 − 2 + (y′2)2)
∂rˇ2
= 0 (27)
‖rˇ1 − r1‖2 − 2 + (y′1)2 = 0 (28)
‖rˇ2 − r2‖2 − 2 + (y′2)2 = 0 (29)
λ′1y
′
1 = 0 (30)
λ′2y
′
2 = 0 (31)
for some λ′1, λ
′
2, y
′
1, y
′
2 (not the same with λ1, λ2, y1, y2).
Expanding (26) and (27), we get
∂η
∂θ1
∂θ1
∂rˇ1
|rˇ1=rˇ#1 +
∂η
∂θ2
(
∂θ2
∂θ1
∂θ1
∂rˇ1
+
∂θ2
∂rˇ2
∂rˇ2
θ1
)
∂θ1
∂rˇ1
|rˇ1=rˇ#1 + 2λ
′
1(rˇ
#
1 − r1) + 2λ′2(rˇ#2 − r2)
∂rˇ2
∂θ1
∂θ1
∂rˇ1
|rˇ1=rˇ#1 = 0
(32)
∂η
∂θ2
∂θ2
∂rˇ2
|rˇ2=rˇ#2 + 2λ
′
2(rˇ
#
2 − r2) = 0 (33)
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Combining (23), (24), (32) and (33), we obtain
∂η
∂θ2
∂θ2
∂θ1
∂θ1
∂rˇ1
|rˇ1=rˇ#1 = ζ
∂η
∂θ1
∂θ1
∂rˇ1
|rˇ1=rˇ#1 (34)
for some ζ, which is the necessary condition for rˇ#1 and rˇ
#
2 being optimal to Problem (P0).
Intuitively, this condition implies that the gradient of η(θ1) w.r.t. rˇ
#
1 (the RHS) should be aligned
with the gradient of η(θ2) w.r.t. rˇ
#
1 (the LHS), without considering the influence of rˇ1 to rˇ2. That is,
although rˇ1 influence θ1, θ1 influences both θ2 and rˇ2 (because rˇ2 is generated by piθ1), LHS does
not include ∂η∂θ2
∂θ2
∂rˇ2
∂rˇ2
∂θ1
∂θ1
∂rˇ1
, which makes (34) computable in many cases.
However, for the setting of our VA2C-P (monitoring attacker for online RL), the attacker at iteration
k = 1 does not know the observed reward r2 of iteration k = 2, which prevent the agent from
conducting the optimal attack. But (34) could help the attacker verify whether a past poison is likely
to be optimal for the iterations so far. For example, if the learner is using VPG, then at iteration k = 2,
the attacker can test whether its previous poison rˇ1 did a good job in minimizing η(θ1) + η(θ2) by
evaluating whether (I +∇2θ1η(θ1))∇θ2η(θ2) is equal to∇θ1η(θ1).
G Additional Experiment Results
Figure 7 shows additional experiment results of poisoning on multiple algorithms. Note that the
selection of  depends on the environment and the algorithm. The larger  is, the better attackers can
do.
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Figure 7: Additional Results for comparison of mean rewards of VPG, PPO, A2C, ACKTR on various
environments, with no poisoning, random poisoning, AC-P and VA2C-P.
Figure 8 demonstrates the additional results of policy discrepancy for VPG, PPO on Hopper and
HalfCheetah environments.
In the supplementary materials we provide the code and instructions, as well as demo videos of
poisoning A2C in the Hopper environment, where one can see under the same budget constraints,
random poisoning has nearly no influence the agent’s behaviors, while our proposed VA2C-P
successfully prevents the agent from hopping forward.
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Figure 8: Additional results for comparison of policy discrepancies at every iteration.
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